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Causation in Rule 10b-5 Actions For
Corporate Mismanagement
Rule 10b-5 1 of the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 has been
likened to the medieval alchemist's "universal solvent" that was so
potent that it dissolved every container devised to hold it.' None-
theless, in recent years the Supreme Court has attempted repeat-
edly to limit the application of the rule.' In Santa Fe Industries,
Inc. v. Green,5 the Court held that mere unfairness or breach of
fiduciary duty, unsupported by allegations of deception or manipu-
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981). The rule states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would oper-
ate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.
The rule was promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1942 under sec-
tion 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), which reads as
follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange ....
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976).
3 Kaplan, Fiduciary Responsibility in the Management of the Corporation, 31 Bus.
LAW. 883, 895-96 (1976). For general commentary on the rule, see A. BROMBERG & L. Low-
ENFELS, SECURITIEs FRAUD & COMMODITIEs FRAUD (1979).
4 The Supreme Court has held that proof of an actual purchase or sale of securities,
rather than a lost opportunity to purchase, is necessary to recover for a violation of rule
10b-5, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754-55 (1975), and that scien-
ter, not mere negligence, is necessary to establish a 10b-5 violation, Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976). See also Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions
Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEo. L.J. 891 (1977).
5 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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lation, is not actionable under rule 10b-5.1 This holding, although
restrictive, did not succeed in pla6ing every breach of fiduciary
duty beyond the compass of the rule. In Goldberg v. Meridor, the
Second Circuit subsequently held that nondisclosure of a breach of
fiduciary duty itself constitutes a violation of rule 10b-5, if the
otherwise powerless shareholders could have sought to enjoin the
alleged breach under state law, had full disclosure been made."
The difficulties inherent in the Goldberg court's reference to
state remedies have only begun to be examined." Courts consider-
ing the question have agreed with Goldberg that in certain cases of
corporate mismanagement, a 10b-5 claim is stated if shareholders
have been denied the opportunity to pursue state injunctive reme-
dies by the defendant's failure to disclose. 10 The courts are di-
8 Id. at 471-74.
567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
8 The commentators are divided as to whether Goldberg eviscerates Santa Fe. See
Note, Goldberg v. Meridor: The Second Circuit's Resurrection of Rule 1Ob-5 Liability for
Breaches of Corporate Fiduciary Duties to Minority Shareholders, 64 VA. L. REv. 765
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Virginia Note] (arguing that Goldberg reopened the doors of
federal courts to matters Santa Fe had relegated to state courts). Accord, Campbell, Santa
Fe. Industries, Inc. v. Green: An Analysis Two Years Later, 30 MAINE L. REV. 187, 192
(1979). But see Note, Suits for Breach of Fiduciary Duty Under Rule 1Ob-5 After Santa Fe
Industries, Inc. v. Green, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1874 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Harvard Note]
(arguing that Goldberg is consistent with Santa Fe).
9 See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 639,
644 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
10 IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 922-23 (2d Cir. 1980); Healey v. Catalyst Recovery,
Inc., 616 F.2d 641, 647 (3d Cir. 1980); Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Co. v. American
Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 606 F.2d 602, 614 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980);
Kidwell ex rel. Penfold v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273, 1292 (9th Cir. 1979); Wright v. Heizer
Corp., 560 F.2d 236, 250 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978); SEC v. Parkland
Hosiery Co., 558 F.2d 1083, 1088 (2d Cir. 1977); Dower v. Mosser Indus., Inc., 488 F. Supp.
1328, 1333-34 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Jacobs v. Hanson, 464 F. Supp. 777, 780-81 (D. Del. 1979).
It has been suggested that this unanimity of opinion lacks sufficient justification. Judge
Aldisert, dissenting in Healey v. Catalyst Recovery, Inc., 616 F.2d 641, 651 (3d Cir. 1980),
argued that Goldberg improperly extends the reach of rule lOb-5. He reasoned that, by im-
plying a cause of action in favor of a shareholder who was deprived of the opportunity to file
a state suit, Goldberg changes the emphasis of rule lob-5 from protection of the "reasonable
investor" to protection of "a certain type of litigant." 616 F.2d at 654. Accord, Virginia
Note, supra note 8, at 777.
Ample precedent supports the view that the federal securities laws were intended to
protect only investment decisions-that is, decisions to purchase or sell securities. The
prevailing materiality standard announced by the Supreme Court in TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976), emphasizes the significance of information to the
"reasonable investor." Similarly, just as materiality under rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9
(1981), which regulates disclosures in proxy solicitations, concentrates on the effect the in-
formation would have had on the investor's vote, materiality under rule lOb-5, which pros-
cribes fraud "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security," see note 1 supra,
The University of Chicago Law Review
vided, however, over what showing of success in the hypothetical
state court action the derivative plaintiff must make to obtain re-
lief under rule 10b-5. The tests developed by the courts of appeals
include a showing of the mere existence of a state remedy,11 a
showing of a prima facie case for the state remedy,1" a showing of a
reasonable probability of ultimate success in the state action, s and
a showing that the state action would have succeeded.14
After reviewing the factual and legal bases of the Goldberg ra-
tionale, this comment distinguishes between the typical 10b-5 case
in which the plaintiff has an investment decision to make, and
cases such as Goldberg and its progeny, in which the plaintiff has a
litigation decision to make. It argues that the relationship between
should focus on information affecting the investor's decision to purchase or sell his securi-
ties. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d 54, 60 (7th Cir.
1979).
It also can be argued that Goldberg, by implying a federal cause of action where state
law relief is available, stands part IV of Santa Fe on its head: it provides federal relief to
plaintiffs who have state remedies and denies federal relief to plaintiffs without state reme-
dies. Virginia Note, supra note 8, at 775-76. Such a regimen of federal protection makes the
imposition of federal liability dependent upon the venue in which the rule 10b-5 action is
brought. Ironically, it also may make the minority shareholder more vulnerable to over-
reaching by corporate fiduciaries, for it removes whatever impetus Santa Fe may have
created for greater state court protection in this area.
It must be noted, however, that from a purely economic perspective there may be no
principled distinction between an "investment decision" and the "litigation decision" that
forms the basis for implying a federal cause of action in Goldberg and its progeny. In either
case, the economic consequences of a consummated decision-be it to buy or sell securities,
vote a proxy, or secure injunctive relief under state law-will be an increase or diminution
in the value of the shareholder's equity interest. Consequently, the decision to seek state
injunctive relief may be as much an "investment decision" as is the decision to vote a proxy
or purchase a security.
11 Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
12 Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Co. v. American Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 606 F.2d 602
(5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980).
13 Healey v. Catalyst Recovery, Inc., 616 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1980).
,4 Kidwell ex rel. Penfold v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979). See also Wright v.
Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978). The decision
in Wright has been interpreted differently by the commentators. Compare Harvard Note,
sapra note 8, at 1893 n.109 (arguing that Wright implied there would be no liability absent
a showing of success in the state action) and Comment, A Post Santa Fe Blueprint for
Courts in Rule 10b-5 Actions for Breach of Fiduciary Duty: Kidwell v. Meikle, 14 U. RICH.
L. REv. 585, 602 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Richmond Note], with Note, Securities
Law-Rule lOb-5-Deception and Materiality Requirements in Corporate Mismanagement
Cases, 66 GEo. L.J. 1593, 1610 n.105 (1978) (suggesting that Wright implied that proof of
the availability of a state cause of action was sufficient to establish 10b-5 liability). The
Seventh Circuit in fact concluded that the plaintiff would have succeeded in state court, but
did not reach the question whether proof of success was essential to the rule 10b-5 claim.
560 F.2d at 250-51.
[48:936
Causation in 10b-5 Actions
the defendant's violation and the plaintiff's injury is attenuated in
the litigation decision case. Consequently, in an action premised on
Goldberg, some showing that the state action would have been suc-
cessful is necessary to establish the causal connection between vio-
lation and injury required for rule 10b-5 liability. The comment
concludes that a prima facie showing of success for state injunctive
relief is the optimum standard, for it is rigorous enough to satisfy
the federal interest in deterring vexatious suits and ensuring full
disclosure, yet liberal enough to avoid a trial of the state claim in
federal court, thus preserving the traditional state interest in the
development of corporation law.
I. RULE 10b-5 AND MISMANAGEMENT BY CORPORATE FIDUCIARIES
A. Patterns of Deception
A plaintiff in a private action for damages under rule 10b-515
must prove that in connection with the purchase or sale of securi-
ties,16 the defendant knowingly 7 made a material misrepresenta-
tion or omission' s that induced the plaintiff to act, or refrain from
acting, to his detriment.' 9 The violation is the deceptive misrepre-
sentation or omission of material facts, and the injury is the eco-
nomic loss precipitated by an investment decision to purchase or
sell securities. The locus of that decision may vary from case to
case. Because a 10b-5 action requires a causal connection between
violation and injury,20 the typical case is one in which the plaintiff
makes the investment decision that leads to his loss. 2' Such cases
" An implied private right of action under rule 10b-5 first was recognized in Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947), and was expressly approved by the
Supreme Court in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9
(1971).
" Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731-55 (1975).
17 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194-214 (1976).
18 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980).
18 In defining the elements of a rule lob-5 cause of action, the courts have borrowed
heavily from the common law tort action for deceit. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 744 (1975); 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1430-44 (2d ed. 1961).
The basic elements of that action are (1) a false representation of fact made by the defen-
dant; (2) knowledge or scienter on the part of the defendant that the representation is false;
(3) an intention to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from action in reliance upon the
misrepresentation; (4) justifiable reliance upon the representation on the part of the plain-
tiff in taking action or refraining from it; and (5) damage to the plaintiff resulting from such
reliance. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 105 (4th ed. 1971).
20 Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 238 (2d Cir.
1974).
21 Klamberg v. Roth, 473 F. Supp. 544, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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include insider trading based on undisclosed material informa-
tion,22 trading prompted by misleading corporate publicity,23 and
broker-dealer misconduct.24 The complaint in such cases is that
the defendant's deceptive conduct induced the plaintiff to
purchase or sell securities to his detriment. Rule 10b-5 operates in
these circumstances to preserve the free market by proscribing ac-
tivities that impede the flow of information between the parties to
a securities transaction. 6
Rule 10b-5 also has been invoked in cases of corporate mis-
management. 26 These cases generally involve three parties. The
complaint is that an insider or controlling shareholder has caused
the corporation to execute a transaction 27 that results in economic
injury to the independent shareholder.2s Because it is the corpora-
tion that has bought or sold the securities, the plaintiff in the 10b-
5 suit for mismanagement is generally the corporate entity, repre-
sented derivatively by the independent shareholders; the defen-
dants are the directors or controlling shareholders responsible for
the challenged transaction.29 Unlike the typical 10b-5 case, the
plaintiff in corporate mismanagement cases is not the investment
decision maker. Rather, the decision to purchase or sell securities
is made by officers or directors, most or all of whom are interested
in the transaction. Alternatively, although shareholder input may
be solicited through a proxy vote, the minority is powerless be-
cause the control group has sufficient strength to approve the
22 See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 883, 845-50 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
23 See, e.g., Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968) (annual report), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 903 (1969); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862-64 (2d Cir. 1968)
(press release), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
24 See, e.g., Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. IlM. 1967) (selling
fictitious securities); First Anchorage Corp., 34 S.E.C. 299 (1952) (false confirmation of
transaction); Behel, Johnson & Co., 26 S.E.C. 163 (1947) (churning).
2" Healey v. Catalyst Recovery, Inc., 616 F.2d 641, 645-46 (3d Cir. 1980); Hundahl v.
United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1349, 1360-64 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
26 4 L. Loss, supra note 19, at 3631 (2d ed. Supp. 1969); Sherrard, Federal Judicial and
Regulatory Responses to Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 35 WASH. & LEE L. RE V. 695,
698 (1978). Alternative terms applied to these cases include "breach of fiduciary duty" or
"conflict of interest transactions." See 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note 3,
§ 4.7(000)(1). Conflict of interest transactions are defined as those to which the company is
a party. By definition, some of the people acting for or controlling the company are also
personally interested in the transaction, depriving it of an arms-length character. Id.
27 Transactions such as short-form mergers or purchases or sales of treasury stock are
typical.
28 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note 3, § 4.7(541).
29 Id. § 4.7(000)(1).
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transaction."0 Deprived of an "investment decision," the indepen-
dent shareholder may be able to make a "litigation decision":31 in
some states, he can seek to enjoin the transaction under state law
for breach of fiduciary duty.
B. Santa Fe
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green3 2 was a case of alleged cor-
porate mismanagement involving a subsidiary, a controlling parent
corporation, and minority shareholders of the subsidiary. Minority
shareholders of Kirby Lumber Corp., the subsidiary, brought a de-
rivative 10b-5 action on behalf of Kirby against Santa Fe Indus-
tries, Inc., a 96 percent controlling shareholder of Kirby that had
completed a short-form merger of the two corporations under Del-
aware law.33 The complaint alleged that the terms of the merger
were unfair but conceded that the majority had made no material
3O Id. § 4.7(551)(2). One of the difficulties in cases of corporate mismanagement under
rule lOb-5 arises in determining who is deceived if the real decision makers (the interested
directors or control persons) are fully apprised of all the facts. This difficulty was respon-
sible in part for the courts' initial refusal to apply rule 10b-5 to claims of corporate misman-
agement. See Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 956 (1952). Subsequently, courts managed to avoid the issue of deception entirely by
holding defendant-insiders liable under the rule merely because they exerted a "controlling
influence" on a corporate transaction to the detriment of the independent shareholders.
This controlling influence test first was articulated in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d
215, 219-20 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969), and subsequently was
adopted by other circuits. See, e.g., Travis v. Anthes Imperial, Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir.
1973); Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1970); Swanson v. American Consumer In-
dus., Inc., 415 F.2d 1326 (7th Cir. 1969). The controlling influence test was characterized as
the "new fraud" because it established a separate ground-unfairness plus control-for rule
10b-5 liability. See Bloomenthal, From Birnbaum to Schoenbaum: The Exchange Act and
Self-Aggrandizement, 15 N.Y.L.F. 332, 346-48 (1969); Comment, Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook:
The "New Fraud" Expands Federal Corporation Law, 55 VA. L. REv. 1103, 1111-16 (1969).
This "new fraud," sounding in breach of fiduciary duty rather than deception, did not sur-
vive Santa Fe. Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 217 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1069 (1978). Consequently, in Goldberg v. Meridor, Judge Friendly developed the theory of
"constructive deception." See text and note at note 44 infra.
3' The terms "investment decision" and "litigation decision" are used in this comment
for descriptive purposes. It has been argued, however, that as a matter of law Goldberg
impermissibly extends rule 10b-5 to "litigation decisions." See note 10 supra.
:2 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
3 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253(a) (1974), permits a parent corporation owning at least
90 percent of the stock of a subsidiary to merge with that subsidiary upon approval by the
parent's board of directors. The statute authorizes the parent to make cash payment for the
shares of the minority stockholders, but does not require the consent of the minority stock-
holders. However, any stockholder who is dissatisfied with the terms of the merger may
petition the Delaware Court of Chancery for an appraisal of the fair value of his shares. Id.
§§ 253, 262 (1974 & Supp. 1980).
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omissions or misstatements.3 4 The Supreme Court found no basis
for a federal claim, holding that mere unfairness or breach of
fiduciary duty, without allegations of deceptive or manipulative
conduct, are not cognizable under section 10b or rule 10b-5 5 The
Court further observed in footnote 14 that, even if there had been
deception in the majority's failure to give the Kirby shareholders
advance notice of the merger,36 such deception was not material
because the derivative plaintiffs did "not indicate how they might
have acted differently had they had prior notice .... [T]hey could
not have enjoined the merger because an appraisal proceeding is
their sole remedy in the Delaware courts for any alleged unfairness
in the terms of the merger. '37 In the absence of a state remedy for
enjoining the merger, the minority shareholders were powerless to
affect the transaction. The Court's holding of immateriality fol-
lowed from the principle that information is not material to those
powerless to act on it.8
In part IV of its opinion, the Court offered an alternative
ground for its decision, stating that a private cause of action
should not be implied because it would not further the policies em-
bodied in the Securities Exchange Act and would trench on areas
traditionally relegated to state law. The Court reasoned that the
fundamental purpose of the Act is not to ensure fairness, but to
implement a policy of "full disclosure." The gravamen of the com-
plaint was that the transaction was unfair; therefore, the Court re-
34 430 U.S. at 474.
35 Id. at 477.
38 The Delaware Corporation Code does not require advance notice. Rather, it requires
only that notice of the merger be given within 10 days after its effective date. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (1974). Nevertheless, plaintiffs argued that defendants' failure to give ad-
vance notice constituted "deception" within the meaning of rule 10b-5. 430 U.S. at 467.
17 430 U.S. at 474 n.14.
38 R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 954 n.41 (4th ed. 1977). Compare
St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 562 F.2d 1040 (8th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978) and Ryan v. J. Walter Thompson, 453 F.2d 444 (2d
Cir. 1971) (failure to disclose that corporation was going public prior to corporation's exer-
cise of its option to purchase plaintiff's stock not material because plaintiff was legally obli-
gated to sell regardless of what he knew), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 907 (1972) with Ayres v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 538 F.2d 532 (3d Cir.) (although firm could repur-
chase employee's stock within 90 days after he retired, information about "going public"
was material to employee's decision as to date of retirement), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1010
(1976).
31 430 U.S. at 478-79. Justices Stevens and Blackmun did not concur in part IV of the
majority opinion, considering it unnecessary to the decision, id. at 480-81, and Justice Bren-
nan dissented for the reasons stated in the majority and concurring opinions in the court of
appeals. Id. at 480.
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fused to recognize a claim that served a "subsidiary purpose" of
the statute.40 The Court also suggested that permitting such a
claim would invite both vexatious litigation from a widely ex-
panded class of plaintiffs and concomitant federal interference
with state corporation law.41
C. Goldberg
The Supreme Court's decision in Santa Fe, although restric-
tive, has not automatically insulated every breach by corporate
fiduciaries from the reach of rule 10b-5. In Goldberg v. Meridor,42
the Second Circuit held that nondisclosure or misleading disclo-
sure of a breach of fiduciary duty constitutes a violation of the
rule, if after full disclosure derivative shareholders could have
sought state injunctive relief against the breach.
Goldberg was a derivative 10b-5 action brought by minority
shareholders of Universal Gas & Oil Company, Inc., charging that
Universal's controlling parent had caused it to purchase shares in
the parent for grossly inadequate consideration. 4 Although Uni-
versal's entire board of directors was fully informed and the share-
holders had no investment decision to make, the Second Circuit,
with Judge Friendly writing for the court, held that the corporate
entity was deceived because the independent shareholders of Uni-
versal were "lulled into security" by the defendants' failure to dis-
close their conflict of interest and the true value of the considera-
tion received." To test the materiality of these undisclosed facts,
40 Id. at 477-78.
41 Id. at 479.
42 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
" The transaction provided for the issuance to the parent, Maritimecor, S.A., of 4.2
million shares of Universal stock in exchange for all of Maritimecor's assets and Universal's
assumption of Maritimecor's liabilities. The transaction allegedly caused the dissipation of
Universal's assets, because the liabilities assumed by Universal exceeded the value of the
assets received from Maritimecor. Id. at 212. The plaintiff alleged that two press releases
issued by Maritimecor describing the transaction were materially deficient in that they
failed to disclose the "conflict of interest of the principals" and that the transaction would
cause Universal to incur a deficit of $3.6 million of current liabilities. Id. at 212 & n.2.
"I Id. at 220-21. This theory of deception of the corporation through its independent
shareholders has been termed "constructive deception." Kaplan v. Bennett, 465 F. Supp.
555, 563-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Project, Recent Developments in Securities Law: Causes of
Action Under Rule 10b-5, 26 BUFFALO L. REv. 503, 567-79 (1977). The Goldberg court de-
rived the theory from the alternative holding in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215,
220 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969), see note 30 supra, which in
turn relied on Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968). Pappas held that where direc-
tors are all interested in a transaction, their knowledge can be imputed to the corporation,
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the court posited a hypothetical disinterested director charged
with making the investment decision. Because the undisclosed
facts would have been important to such a director in deciding
whether to approve the transaction, the court concluded that the
withheld facts were material.45 Seizing on the "negative implica-
tion"48 of footnote 14 of Santa Fe to support this finding of mate-
riality, the court argued that the shareholders of Universal, unlike
the plaintiffs in Santa Fe, were not powerless because New York
law would have permitted them to seek injunctive relief to block
the transaction.47 The court did not inquire whether the plaintiffs
would have succeeded in such an action, although Judge Meskill
argued in dissent that footnote 14 of Santa Fe required the deriva-
tive plaintiff to show that he would have "sought and obtained" an
injunction, had full disclosure been made.48
The Second Circuit in Goldberg thus concluded that the deriv-
ative plaintiff need only demonstrate that state injunctive reme-
dies would have been available if full disclosure had been made.
Four circuits have since considered the issue, however, and all have
thereby negating deception, only if full disclosure has been made to the independent share-
holders. Id. at 869. Without full disclosure, the corporation (qua independent shareholders)
is deceived. This theory of constructive deception arguably is inconsistent with Santa Fe.
See Virginia Note, supra note 8, at 772-74. Once full disclosure to the board of directors has
been made, as it was in Goldberg, the only purpose a derivative suit could serve is to protect
a minority shareholder's equity interest from unfair self-dealing. Id. at 772. "Constructive
deception" simply may be another term for breach of fiduciary duty and thus outside the
scope of rule 10b-5 as delineated in Santa Fe. A full treatment of this issue, however, is
beyond the scope of this comment. See generally 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra
note 3, § 4.7(556).
45 567 F.2d at 219.
46 Kerrigan v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 450 F. Supp. 639, 644 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (the Kerrigan court's characterization of the way the Goldberg court construed Santa
Fe).
4 567 F.2d at 220. The Second Circuit previously had held that the availability of state
injunctive relief was relevant in deciding materiality in an SEC enforcement action under
rule 10b-5. SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977). The court in Park-
lane, however, was careful to distinguish that case from a private action for damages. Thus,
it is unclear whether Judge Friendly's reference to the availability of state remedies consti-
tutes an alternate materiality holding, or merely an attempt to distinguish Santa Fe. Of
course, the two interpretations amount to the same thing in that materiality was found
wanting in Santa Fe. See text and note at note 38 supra. It is noteworthy, however, that in
considering materiality under the Goldberg rationale, the courts of appeals have emphasized
the existence of state injunctive remedies. See Healey v. Catalyst Recovery, Inc., 616 F.2d
641, 647 (3d Cir. 1980); Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Co. v. American Fidelity Life Ins.
Co., 606 F.2d 602, 613-14 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980); Kidwell ex rel.
Penfold v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273, 1292-93 (9th Cir. 1979); Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d
236, 250 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978).
4s 567 F.2d at 223 (Meskill, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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held that the derivative plaintiff must make some additional show-
ing that he would have succeeded in the state action had he not
been lulled into security by the defendant's deception.49 But these
courts disagree about why such a showing is necessary and about
how extensive the showing must be to establish liability under rule
10b-5. The standards developed by these courts range from a
showing of a prima facie case for state-law relief to a showing of
actual success in the state action.50
II. THE ELEMENTS OF A RULE 10b-5 SUIT: MATERIALITY,
RELIANCE AND CAUSATION
The conflict between the circuits over the test for when relief
will be forthcoming under Goldberg is attributable in large part to
their failure to analyze adequately the elements of a 10b-5
claim-materiality, reliance, and causation. If those elements are
parsed correctly, it can be demonstrated that, contrary to
Goldberg, rule 10b-5 should be read to require the derivative plain-
tiff to make some showing of success in the hypothetical state
action.
Under rule 10b-5, deception by misrepresentation or omission
is not sufficient by itself to establish liability; the information in
question must be material. The element of materiality measures
the gravity of the defendant's deception.5 1 The prevailing test of
materiality was announced by the Supreme Court in TSC Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.:' 2 an omitted or misrepresented fact is
material if there is a "substantial likelihood" that it "would have
assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable
shareholder" or "reasonable investor." If, as in Santa Fe, the
shareholder has no decision to make-that is, if the shareholder is
powerless to affect the transaction-no information can be mate-
rial to him."
49 See cases cited at notes 12-14 supra.
50 See id.
'z Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384 (1970).
" 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). TSC Industries was a decision under Rule 14a-9 of the
federal proxy rules, but its definition of materiality was cited with approval in Santa Fe
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474 n.14 (1977), and has been deemed applicable to the
securities laws in general by numerous courts of appeals. See, e.g., Steadman v. SEC, 603
F.2d 1126, 1130 (5th Cir. 1979); Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 218-19 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978); Alton Box Board Co. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 560 F.2d
916, 919-20 (8th Cir. 1977); Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236, 247-48 (7th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978).
53 See text and note at note 38 supra.
1981]
The University of Chicago Law Review
The concept of reliance requires the plaintiff to prove that the
defendant's misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in-
duced the plaintiff to act or refrain from acting in a certain way."
Proof of reliance thus involves proof that the defendant's decep-
tion actually distorted the plaintiff's decision making process.5 5 In
certain cases, however, the nature of the defendant's deception
erects insuperable obstacles to establishing positive proof of reli-
ance. Consequently, in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.5 6 and Affili-
ated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States,57 the Supreme Court
relaxed the reliance requirement, permitting it to be presumed
upon a finding of materiality.
Plaintiffs in Mills, shareholders in Electric Auto-Lite Com-
pany, sued as a class and derivatively under section 14a55 and rule
14a-9 59 of the Securities Exchange Act to set aside a merger effec-
tuated by a control group through materially deficient proxy solici-
tations.60 The plaintiffs were so numerous that the Court found it
impossible to inquire into the question of reliance on the part of
each individual."1 Rather, the Court held that if the defendant's
misstatements or omissions were material, and the solicitation it-
self was an "essential link" in the transaction, there was no need to
prove that the votes of any of the actual shareholders were influ-
enced by the defendant's deception.2 This presumption of reliance
was held to be irrebutable even by a showing that the transaction
voted upon was fair. 3
W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 108.
5 In a case involving an affirmative misrepresentation by a defendant in connection
with the plaintiff's purchase or sale of securities, reliance is determined by ascertaining
whether the plaintiff believed the defendant, and if so, whether that belief induced the
plaintiff to enter the transaction. In a case involving a material omission, however, the ques-
tion of reliance is a hypothetical one-whether the plaintiff would have acted differently if
he had known the withheld fact. This question is similar to the question of material-
ity-whether a reasonable investor would have deemed the fact significant. R. JENNINGS &
H. MARSH, supra note 38, at 1063-64.
56 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
406 U.S. 128 (1972).
15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976).
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1981).
GO The merger was between Electric Auto-Lite Co. and Mergenthaler Linotype Co.,
which controlled 54 percent of the outstanding shares of Auto-Lite. The plaintiffs claimed
that the proxy statement failed to disclose that the Auto-Lite directors were controlled by
Mergenthaler, and thus that their recommendation of the merger was misleading. 396 U.S.
at 378.
6 Id. at 380.
62 Id. at 385.
G3 Id. at 382.
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In Affiliated Ute Citizens, Indians suing under rule 10b-5 al-
leged that bank employees purchased shares of a tribal land devel-
opment company from them without disclosing the higher price at
which the securities were being resold to whites in a market fos-
tered by the bank. Again rejecting the argument that the plaintiffs
had to show positive proof of reliance, the Supreme Court held
that "[u]nder the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a
failure to disclose," reliance could be presumed from a finding that
the facts withheld were material."
Mills and Affiliated Ute establish that reliance may be pre-
sumed from a finding of materiality in certain types of cases where
it otherwise cannot be proved that the defendant's violation dis-
torted the plaintiff's decision making process.s Neither case, how-
ever, abolished the requirement that the plaintiff suing under rule
10b-5 prove a causal connection between the defendant's violation
of the rule (the misstatement or omission of material fact) and the
plaintiff's injury (economic loss).," The causation requirement is
analytically distinct from the reliance requirement. Reliance tests
whether there is a relation between the defendant's violation and
the plaintiff's decision making process; causation, on the other
hand, tests whether there is a relation between the defendant's vio-
lation and the plaintiff's injury.67 Although the two concepts are
406 U.S. at 153-54.
61 Cases that present obstacles to direct proof of reliance include those involving the
mass exercise of proxy rights, e.g., Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc. 458 F.2d 255 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972), and those involving a failure to disclose, e.g., Titan
Group Inc. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234, 238-39 (2d Cir.) ("in instances of ... non-disclosure
• it is impossible to demonstrate reliance"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 840 (1975). See gener-
ally R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 38, at 1064-68.
6 See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 50-51 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
See also Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234, 238-39 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
840 (1975); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir.
1974).
87 Some courts and commentators have abandoned the effort to parse causation from
reliance. See text and note at note 72 infra. Instead, they simply have split causation in the
context of the federal securities laws into two categories-"transaction causation" and "loss
causation." See Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380-81 (2d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975); 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note 3,
§ 4.7(551)(1)-(2); Note, Causation and Liability in Private Actions for Proxy Violations, 80
YALE L.J. 107, 124-25 (1970). Transaction causation is said to test whether the defendant's
violation caused the transaction; loss causation is said to test whether the violation caused
the injury alleged. Id. at 125. This comment eschews the use of these catch phrases. See R.
JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 38, at 1063. The elements of the common law tort action
for deceit-materiality, reliance and causation-serve the same analytical purpose if used
with sufficient precision. Indeed, "transaction causation" essentially is synonymous with re-
liance, and "loss causation" is synonymous with the causation requirement of rule 10b-5.
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analytically distinct, in practice proof of reliance frequently, but
not always, supplies proof of the requisite causal connection.
In the typical 10b-5 case where the plaintiff makes the invest-
ment decision, proof of reliance logically compels a finding of cau-
sation. The complaint is that the defendant's misstatement or
omission of fact induced the plaintiff to buy stock that was worth
less than he paid for it or, as in Affiliated Ute, to sell stock that
was worth more than he received. 8 Because the plaintiff makes the
investment decision that precipitates the injury, his injury flows
directly from the distortion of his own decision making process
caused by his reliance on the defendant's deception. 9
Thus, in the typical 10b-5 action involving an individual in-
vestor's decision to purchase or sell securities, proof of reli-
ance-whether positive or presumptive-establishes a fortiori
proof of a causal connection between violation and injury.70 It is
not surprising that courts and commentators have misread Mills
and Affiliated Ute as holding that causation as well as reliance can
be presumed from materiality 1 and that they have used the terms
reliance and causation interchangeably.7 2 This imprecision, how-
ever, is the source of the conflict regarding the plaintiff's required
standard of proof under Goldberg. Mills and Affiliated Ute create
a presumption of reliance only. Causation may be inferred from
reliance only when the plaintiff makes the investment decision.
88 R. JENNGS & H. MARSH, supra note 38, at 1069.
See also Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1172 (2d Cir. 1970); 1 A.
BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note 3, § 4.7(551)(2).
10 See, e.g., 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note 3, § 4.7(551)(2) (in direct per-
sonal deals, transaction causation is subsumed into loss causation); W. PROSSER, supra note
19, § 108 (reliance is subsumed in the requirement of a causal connection between the
wrongful conduct and the resulting damage).
71 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note 3, § 4.7(555). The language of the Mills
opinion is ambiguous. The Court stated the issue in terms of reliance: "The question with
which we deal is what causal relationship must be shown between [defendant's alleged viola-
tion] and the merger." 396 U.S. at 377. It stated the holding, however, in terms of causation:
"Where there has been a finding of materiality, a shareholder has made a sufficient showing
of causal relationship between the violation and the injury." Id. at 385. This inconsistency
in language can be viewed as a manifestation of the Court's intuitive perception that pre-
sumptive proof of reliance establishes causality where the plaintiff made the investment
decision.
72 See, e.g., Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1172 (2d Cir. 1970) (test of
"reliance" is "causation in fact"); Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff, 266 F. Supp. 524, 530 (S.D.N.Y.
1967) (referring to the "causation requirement" rather than the "reliance requirement");
Note, The Controlling Influence Standard in Rule 10b-5 Corporate Mismanagement Cases,
86 HARV. L. REv. 1007, 1023 n.72 (1973) ("This Note will not distinguish the term "causa-
tion" from "reliance.").
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Where the plaintiff does not participate in the investment decision,
as in Goldberg and its progeny, his injury results only indirectly
from the defendant's violation. Although the Mills-Affiliated Ute
presumption may be invoked to establish reliance in this case, cau-
sation remains a distinct element for which the plaintiff must offer
independent proof.
III. PROOF OF SUCCESS AND CAUSATION: THE CASE LAW
The most vexing question in cases premised on Goldberg is
whether rule 10b-5 requires the derivative plaintiff to show that he
actually would have succeeded in the state suit. All but one7 3 of the
several courts to consider this issue have viewed it as an aspect of
the materiality requirement under the federal law. 4 These courts
subscribe to the view that proof of success is unnecessary because,
by virtue of Mills and Affiliated Ute, a finding of materiality,
which triggers the presumption of reliance, disposes of any prob-
lem of causation.7 5 This view is implicit in the Goldberg court's
holding that mere proof of the availability of a cause of action
under state law-without regard to the probable outcome of such a
suit-is sufficient to establish rule 10b-5 liability. Adherents to this
view argue by analogy to Mills: because that case dispensed with
the need to prove that enough shareholders would have changed
their votes to defeat the challenged merger, there is no need in
actions based on Goldberg to show that the plaintiff would have
succeeded in the state suit.76
In Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Pennsylvania, Inc., the
Third Circuit adopted a variation of the Goldberg view. It held
that a finding of "materiality," which triggers the Mills-Affiliated
Ute presumption of reliance, "adequately dispose[s]" of "any
problems of causation" 78 under Goldberg. The Healey court stated,
however, that materiality itself is dependent on some showing of
73 Kidwell ex rel. Penfold v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979). See text and notes
at notes 82-90 infra.
74 See, e.g., Healey v. Catalyst Recovery, Inc., 616 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1980); Wright v.
Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Goldberg v.
Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978). It is unclear what
mode of analysis the Fifth Circuit used in Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v.
American Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 606 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820
(1980).
71 See also Harvard Note, supra note 8, at 1894-95.
76 Id.
- 616 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1980).
76 Id. at 649.
19811
The University of Chicago Law Review
success in the hypothetical state action.
In Healey, a 20 percent minority shareholder brought a rule
10b-5 action against an 80 percent controlling shareholder who
withheld material facts regarding a merger approved by share-
holder vote.7 9 Although the majority had sufficient strength to ap-
prove the transaction, the court found that the plaintiff was not
powerless because he could have brought suit under state law to
enjoin the merger. Viewing the issue of proof of success in the state
action as an aspect of the federal materiality requirement, the
court declared that unless there is a reasonable probability that a
shareholder could have used the withheld facts to enjoin the
merger in state court, the information would not be material to the
shareholder's litigation decision.80 Consequently, the court held
that to establish the materiality of the defendant's deception the
plaintiff must show that, at the time of the misrepresentation or
omission, there was a "reasonable probability of ultimate success
in securing a state injunction," if full disclosure had been made.81
In Kidwell ex rel. Penfold v. Meikle82 the Ninth Circuit re-
jected Goldberg and Healey and viewed the issue of success in the
hypothetical state action as an aspect of rule 10b-5's causation re-
quirement. In Kidwell, minority shareholders in an Idaho non-
profit corporation brought a derivative 10b-5 action against the
corporation's directors, who had voted to sell its assets to a Wyo-
ming concern. The court found deception in the defendant-direc-
tors' failure to disclose certain conflicts of interest.8 Although
shareholder approval of the transaction was not necessary because
the corporation was insolvent, Idaho law would have permitted the
derivative shareholders to bring suit to enjoin the sale." In deter-
mining whether the nondisclosures were material, Kidwell explic-
itly disapproved the Goldberg materiality test, which focuses on
the importance of the information to an imaginary disinterested
director.85 The court also rejected the view stated by the Third
7' Because the plaintiff in Healey was not suing derivatively, his action did not depend
on deception of the corporation.
80 616 F.2d at 647.
81 Id.
82 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979).
" The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had failed to disclose that some directors
of the nonprofit corporation were shareholders in a for-profit "sister corporation," that some
directors had assumed personal liability for corporate debts, and that one director may have
acted as legal counsel to both the nonprofit and for-profit corporations. Id. at 1282-85, 1293.
84 Id. at 1293.
88 Id. at 1293 n.10. See text and note at note 45 supra.
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Circuit in Healey, that materiality is dependent on some showing
of success in the state action. Instead, the Ninth Circuit focused on
the shareholder's litigation decision and found the withheld facts
to be material "[s]ince a reasonable minority shareholder probably
would have considered this information important in any decision
whether or not to sue to block the sale." '86
The court observed that under Mills and Affiliated Ute, such
a finding of materiality creates a presumption of reliance-that the
defendant's violation induced the minority shareholders to refrain
from filing suit in state court to block the sale. 7 The court, how-
ever, asserted that this presumption of reliance "does not dispose
of the entire element of causation in the Rule 10b-5 suit ... The
mere fact that a minority. . . [shareholder] may have been able to
state a claim in a suit under state law to block the sale does not
mean that he or she would have been successful."8 8 The Ninth Cir-
cuit thus viewed the issue of success in the state suit as an aspect
of the causation requirement. Because only the reality or credible
threat of obtaining a state injunction would have deterred the
corporate fiduciaries from completing the transaction, proof of a
causal relation between violation and injury required some showing
that the state action would have been successful. The Kidwell
court consequently held that the plaintiff must show that he
"would have succeeded in getting permanent injunctive relief, or
damages in excess of an appraisal remedy, in the state-law ac-
tion."89 Contemplating a complete trial of the state claim, Kidwell
declared that whether the state suit would have succeeded was pri-
marily a question of fact for the jury, but directed the federal trial
court to "decide any legal issues that would have arisen in the hy-
pothetical state suit as a matter of law in the Rule 10b-5 suit."90
IV. THE PROPER TEST FOR LIABILITY
Only Kidwell developed a standard of proof that recognizes
the distinction between the litigation decision central to Goldberg
and its progeny, and the investment decision characteristic of
other 10b-5 suits. The court in Kidwell correctly formulated the
materiality test in terms of this litigation decision. More impor-
,' 597 F.2d at 1293.
87 Id. at 1293-94.
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tantly, it recognized that where the investment decision that
causes the injury is not made by the plaintiff, proof of reliance fails
to establish automatically a causal connection between defendant's
violation and plaintiff's injury. The Kidwell requirement of dem-
onstrating complete success in the hypothetical state action, how-
ever, conflicts with principles of federalism, which limit the show-
ing of success a federal court may require the 10b-5 plaintiff to
make.
A. Materiality
According to TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,91 the
materiality of a misrepresented or omitted fact depends on its
"significance" to the decision making process of a "reasonable in-
vestor. ' '92 Because in the case of corporate mismanagement the
corporation itself is the investor, the Goldberg court phrased the
materiality inquiry in terms of the importance of the information
to an imaginary disinterested director charged with making the in-
vestment decision.93 The court was misguided, however, in at-
tempting to make the corporate mismanagement case conform to
the investment decision paradigm by invoking the services of an
imaginary director. Where a majority or all of the directors are in-
terested in the transaction, the independent shareholder is the
only party capable of protecting the corporation's interests by
filing an injunctive action under state law. If injunctive relief is
unavailable, no misrepresentation or omission, however egregious,
can be deemed material. Having implied a rule 10b-5 cause of ac-
tion because state injunctive remedies exist, Goldberg logically
should have phrased the materiality inquiry, as did Kidwell, with
reference to an actual shareholder capable of resorting to such
remedies.94
If the proper subject of the materiality inquiry is the share-
holder, the next question is what information would be material to
his deliberations. The Third Circuit in Healey stated that a with-
held fact is significant only if there is a reasonable probability that
a shareholder could have used it to obtain state relief.9 5 This test
controverts the Supreme Court's admonition in TSC Industries to
91 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
91 Id. at 449. See text and notes at notes 51-53 supra.
93 567 F.2d at 219.
" See Sherrard, supra note 26, at 712.
95 616 F.2d at 647.
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test the materiality of facts by their significance to the delibera-
tions of the reasonable shareholder, not by their significance to the
probable outcome of those deliberations. Moreover, the Healey
test fails to consider that a plaintiff may file a state action on in-
formation and belief.9 6 Consequently, in certain cases, such as vex-
atious suits, the decision to file may be wholly unrelated to the
probability of success on the merits. In other cases, the informa-
tion withheld may not evince a reasonable probability of success,
but may be sufficiently suggestive to warrant the filing of a suit
and the pursuit of further facts through discovery. Thus, the mate-
riality of facts must be judged, as it-was in Kidwell, solely with
reference to their significance to the shareholder's decision to seek
state relief, not their significance to the probability of obtaining
such relief. The latter inquiry is relevant only to the element of
causation.
B. The Necessity of Demonstrating Causation
In cases premised on Goldberg, a finding of materiality should
not be viewed as automatically establishing a causal connection be-
tween the defendant's violation and the plaintiff's injury. Mills and
Affiliated Ute establish that in certain cases proof of materiality
creates a presumption of reliance. When the plaintiff is the invest-
ment decision maker, a causal connection between violation and
injury can be inferred automatically from such a presumption. In
Goldberg and its progeny, however, the plaintiff is presented with
a litigation decision rather than an investment decision.9" Conse-
quently, a presumption of reliance does not operate to establish
causation: even if it is presumed that the defendant's violation
lulled the plaintiff into refraining from filing a state suit, it does
not follow a fortiori that that violation caused the plaintiff's injury.
Rather, the defendant's violation can be said to have caused the
plaintiff's injury only if the state suit would have succeeded in de-
terring the defendant-insiders from the purchase or sale of securi-
ties that led to that injury. Thus, the existence of the state suit in
cases like Goldberg so attenuates the relationship between viola-
tion and injury" that some showing that the plaintiff would have
Id. at 651 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
" See text and notes at notes 26-31 supra.
"8 The relationship between violation and injury is even more attenuated in cases aris-
ing in states where injunctive relief for breach of fiduciary duty is available only through the
offices of the state attorney general. See, e.g., People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., 83 Misc. 2d
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succeeded in the state action is essential to establish the requisite
causal connection. 9
Moreover, the presumption of Mills and Affiliated Ute is in-
voked properly only in cases that present inherent obstacles to di-
rect proof of reliance. Thus in Mills, a class action, it was pre-
sumed that a sufficient number of shareholders would have
changed their votes to defeat the transaction because it was impos-
sible to inquire into reliance on the part of thousands of individu-
als.100 Similar obstacles to proof do not exist in cases like Goldberg.
Because federal courts frequently rule on questions of state law,
the federal trial court is competent to determine whether the hy-
pothetical state action would have been successful. Consequently,
the Mills-Affiliated Ute presumption should not relieve the deriva-
tive plaintiff of the burden of showing success in the hypothetical
state action.
C. Limitations on the Degree of Proof Required
Although some showing of success in the hypothetical state
suit should be necessary to establish causation in a rule 10b-5
claim premised on Goldberg, competing federal and state interests
120, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 50 A.D.2d 787, 377 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1975). In such a
case, materiality must be judged with respect to the shareholder's decision to file a com-
plaint with the state attorney general. If materiality is established, Mills and Affiliated Ute
permit a presumption that the shareholder in fact would have filed a complaint. It would
strain logic, however, to argue that such a presumption automatically establishes causa-
tion-that is, that the attorney general subsequently would have filed a state action, that
the action would have succeeded, and that the plaintiff's injury thus would have been
averted.
"Justice Blackmun, the author of Affiliated Ute, employed similar reasoning in his
concurring opinion in Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 48 (1977). He argued that
in a suit by a defeated tender offeror to recover damages as a result of securities law viola-
tions by its competitor, the Mills-Affiliated Ute presumption suffices to establish reli-
ance-that is, that the competitor's violations induced the shareholders of the target com-
pany to tender to it. Id. at 51. According to Justice Blackmun, however, this presumption of
reliance does not also establish causation-that the competitor's violations caused the plain-
tiff to lose the contest for control. Rather, he argued that the disappointed offeror still must
present some evidence that the competitor's material misstatements or omissions caused the
injury of which the offeror complains: "[T]he absence of any evidence that the violations
might have altered the outcome of the contest for control would leave me unable to hold
that the securities law violations caused the disappointed contestant's ultimate injury-its
failure to acquire control of the target corporation." Id. at 51. Similarly, in Goldberg and its
progeny, the Mills-Affiliated Ute presumption may suffice to prove that the defendant-in-
sider's violation caused the derivative plaintiff to refrain from filing a state injunctive ac-
tion, but the plaintiff still should show a causal connection between the violation and the
injury alleged.
100 See text and notes at notes 58-63 supra.
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circumscribe the showing that a federal court may require the
plaintiff to make. The federal interest in preventing vexatious liti-
gation favors Kidwell's standard of a showing of complete success.
The states' interest in the unimpeded development of their corpo-
ration law, however, militates against so rigorous a standard be-
cause it compels a complete trial of the state claim in federal court.
The Supreme Court has expressed on numerous occasions a
desire to avoid frivolous suits and vexatious litigation from a
widely expanded class of plaintiffs under rule lOb-5.10 1 The Court
has observed that even an unmeritorious 10b-5 claim has an in ter-
rorem settlement value,102 and a desire to avoid such suits was
cited by the Court as a reason for dismissing the plaintiff's action
in Santa Fe.10 If, as has been argued, 0 the Goldberg court's im-
plication of a 10b-5 cause of action in favor of the "reasonable liti-
gant," as opposed to the "reasonable investor," reopens the doors
of federal courts to matters Santa Fe intended to relegate to state
courts, then permitting a plaintiff to establish rule 10b-5 liability
under Goldberg without some showing of success in the state ac-
tion would only further eviscerate Santa Fe. Absent a requirement
for such a showing, it would be impossible for federal courts to
discriminate between bona fide and frivolous 10b-5 claims.
The Court's emphasis on federalism in Santa Fe, however,
militates against adoption of the Kidwell standard. Part IV of
Santa Fe constitutes a direction to the federal judiciary that the
federal securities laws should not be expanded to usurp or inter-
fere with state corporation law; 05 some federal courts accordingly
have refused to construe state law on the grounds that such an
inquiry would contravene Santa Fe.108 Yet in evaluating whether
"01 See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 n.33 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 742 (1975). See generally Lowenfels, supra note 4.
101 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 742 (1975).
103 430 U.S. at 478-79.
14 Virginia Note, supra note 8, at 765. See also note 10 supra.
106 430 U.S. at 478. See text and notes at notes 39-41 supra.
10' See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 639
(S.D.N.Y. 1978). Kerrigan involved a corporation's exercise of an option to repurchase stock
from employees without disclosing that the corporation planned to go public. The plaintiffs'
materiality theory was that had they known the true facts, they would have resisted the
transaction by asking the state court to make new law holding the challenged transaction
discriminatory under state fiduciary standards. The federal court rejected this argument,
stating that "rule 10b-5 was not designed to serve as a federal vehicle for raising pure state
law questions. If this were permitted, federal courts would be required to speculate on new
questions of state corporation law in order to determine only one element of the federal 10b-
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the derivative plaintiff's state suit actually would have been suc-
cessful, federal courts would be compelled to determine the fair-
ness of the transaction under state law. Although Santa Fe re-
jected only the imposition of a federal fairness standard, a federal
court's interpretation of a state fairness standard has potential for
substantial interference with the development of state corporation
law.1"" Kidwell reasoned that such interference can be minimized
only by a complete trial in federal court of the hypothetical state
claim.108 In that trial the federal court would be compelled to ap-
ply exactly the same fairness standard that would have been ap-
plied by the state court. This test, however, proves too much. The
federal purpose under rule 10b-5 is to ensure full disclosure and to
redress deception. The hypothetical state action is relevant only
for purposes of establishing the materiality of the alleged decep-
tion and its causal relation to the plaintiff's injury. A standard of
actual success goes beyond the limited federal purpose to afford
minority shareholders "the same right they would have had if full
disclosure had been made, i.e., the right to obtain a judicial deter-
mination of the fairness of a transaction" under state law. 019 Such
a determination is interdicted by part IV of Santa Fe, which ruled
that fairness was but a subsidiary purpose of the Securities Ex-
change Act.
D. A Prima Facie Standard of Causation
I The appropriate showing of success in the state action must lie
somewhere between the extremes of Goldberg and Kidwell.110 That
standard was set forth by the Fifth Circuit in Alabama Farm
Bureau Mutual Casualty Co. v. American Fidelity Life Insurance
Co.,"' where the court required the derivative plaintiff to show
that he would have had a prima facie case for state injunctive re-
lief. The case was a derivative action in which a minority share-
5 claim." Id. at 646. See also Voege v. Magnavox Co., 439 F. Supp. 935, 942 (D. Del. 1977)
(declining to construe state law to determine if an attorney's opinion in a proxy statement
was correct, because to do so would disregard "the restrictive philosophy expressed in Part
IV of the Santa Fe decision").
107 See Harvard Note, supra note 8, at 1895.
108 597 F.2d at 1294.
109 Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236, 250 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066
(1978).
10 But compare Harvard Note, supra note 8, at 1895-98 (arguing that the Goldberg
standard is correct) with Richmond Note, supra note 14, at 601-03 (arguing that the
Kidwell standard is the appropriate measure of proof).
606 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980).
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holder charged that corporate directors had violated rules 10b-5
and 14a-9 by causing the corporation to launch a stock repurchase
program to perpetuate their control, without disclosing the infla-
tionary effect the repurchase plan would have on the price of the
outstanding stock.112 The court held that to establish rule 10b-5
liability, a derivative plaintiff must show that "state law remedies
were available and that the facts shown make out a prima facie
case for relief; it is not necessary to go further and prove that the
state action would have been successful.""' The court reasoned
that to permit recovery merely because state law remedies existed,
as Goldberg did, was to predicate federal relief on a hypothetical
basis, but that to permit recovery only upon proof of victory, as
Kidwell did, effectively would require the equivalent of a trial of
the state claim in federal court.
The standard of proof developed in Alabama Farm is rigorous
enough to effectuate the federal interest in promoting full disclo-
sure while avoiding vexatious suits, yet liberal enough to protect
the traditional state interest in the development of corporation
law. The prima facie standard requires the plaintiff to produce suf-
ficient evidence on the state claim to survive a directed verdict or
motion to dismiss, thus shifting the burden of nonpersuasion to
the defendant.1 1 ' Although such a showing does not establish with
certainty that the plaintiff would have secured a state injunction,
it does establish that he would have presented a credible threat of
deterring the challenged transaction.115
212 The derivative plaintiff, Alabama Farm, had acquired its 20 percent share of defen-
dant American Fidelity as part of a plan to obtain control of American Fidelity. This fact
led Judge Skelton to dissent partly on the ground that Alabama Farm had brought a vexa-
tious suit to gain through litigation the control it had failed to acquire in the marketplace.
Id. at 618 n.1.
,2$ Id. at 614.
' There are two senses in which courts use the concept of a prima facie case, and it is
often difficult, as with the Fifth Circuit's decision, to determine which a court intends to
apply. 9 J. WGMORE, EVmENCE § 2494 (3d ed. 1940). The term often is used in the sense of
the plaintiff producing evidence sufficient to survive a motion for a directed verdict or a
motion to dismiss. This "sufficiency of the evidence" test frequently is referred to as a
"prima facie case." Id. Courts also use "prima facie" to indicate that the plaintiff, who bears
the risk of nonpersuasion before the jury, not only has produced evidence sufficient to get
past the judge to the jury, but has shifted the risk of nonpersuasion to the defendant. Id.
See also White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 1974).
The court in Alabama Farm failed to define what it meant by a "prima facie case." The
second, stricter definition is the one that should be used: it best achieves the dual purpose
of establishing causation and preserving state-federal comity.
16 That proof of something less than absolute success is sufficient to establish the
requisite causal connection is implicit in Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in Piper v.
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The prima facie standard also avoids the necessity of a com-
plete trial of the state claim in federal court. Because the existence
of a prima facie case can be determined as a matter of law by the
court, the potential for federal interference with state corporation
law is minimized. Unlike the Ninth Circuit's actual success stan-
dard116 and the Third Circuit's "reasonable probability of ultimate
success" standard," 7 the prima facie standard avoids burdening
the federal jury with the difficult task of testing the relevant facts
against the applicable state law to determine the outcome of the
hypothetical state suit." 8 Finally, as evidenced by Goldberg itself,
most rule 10b-5 actions arise on a motion to dismiss or on a motion
for summary judgment. The procedural posture of these cases is
such that the plaintiff has yet to develop sufficient evidence to es-
tablish conclusively that a state court action would have been suc-
cessful; therefore, only the prima facie standard is suitable for the
typical case in which a causation test must be applied.
The prima facie standard developed by the Fifth Circuit is
both conceptually sound and administratively practical. It must be
recognized, however, that such a standard represents a compromise
between the federal interest in ensuring a free market in securities
transactions, and the traditional state interest in the regulation of
corporate affairs. 19 Indeed, the disparate tests for determining the
availability of 10b-5 relief in cases like Goldberg demonstrate the
difficulty federal courts are having, and will continue to have, with
expansively construing the federal securities laws while attempting
to avoid conflicts with state corporation law. The prima facie stan-
dard does not eliminate the potential for state-federal conflict in-
herent in the Goldberg regimen of recognizing a federal cause of
action only where state remedies are available. The standard does,
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 48 (1977). Blackmun would have denied Chris-Craft
federal relief because there was an "absence of any evidence that the violations" caused the
injury of which Chris-Craft complained. Id. at 51 (emphasis added).
116 Kidwell ex rel. Penfold v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273, 1294 (9th Cir. 1979).
17 Healey v. Catalyst Recovery, Inc., 616 F.2d 641, 648 (3d Cir. 1980).
118 This is a virtue particularly in cases involving multinational securities transactions,
where the applicable "state law" may be the law of a foreign country. See, e.g., IIT v.
Cornfeld, 462 F. Supp. 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (plaintiffs argued that they would have been
able to establish a claim for an injunction under the law of Luxembourg, if full disclosure
had been made), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980). In
such a case, the legal determination of a prima facie case by the federal court is difficult
enough; a jury determination of absolute success would be virtually impossible.
1' See Healey v. Catalyst Recovery, Inc., 616 F.2d 641, 660 (3d Cir. 1980) (Aldisert, J.,
dissenting).
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however, minimize federal encroachment on the state scheme of
corporate regulation.
CONCLUSION
This comment has advocated that the issue of the plaintiff's
standard of proof under Goldberg be resolved in favor of requiring
the derivative plaintiff to make out a prima facie case for entitle-
ment to state court relief. In cases like Goldberg, as opposed to the
typical rule 10b-5 case, the plaintiff is presented with a litigation
decision, not an investment decision. Consequently, a causal con-
nection between the defendant's violation of the rule and the
plaintiff's injury cannot be inferred automatically from proof of
the parallel elements of materiality and reliance. Some showing
that the plaintiff would have succeeded in the hypothetical state
action is necessary to establish the requisite causal connection.
Demonstration of a prima facie case for state relief is sufficient for
the imposition of 10b-5 liability. The prima facie standard is rigor-
ous enough to establish causation, thus preventing vexatious litiga-
tion, yet liberal enough to avoid a trial of the state claim in federal
court, thus minimizing federal interference with state corporation
law.
Gary R. Edson
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